







e’ve all seen the checklists with sugges-
tions for how to secure your system. Many 
of us have even written them. (I have.) 
The problem is that security is more 
complicated than that, and checklists—especially if followed
slavishly or enforced without 
thought—can make matters worse.
Passwords are one case in point. 
Users, we’re told, should pick un-
guessable passwords and never 
write them down. System devel-
opers should ensure that passwords 
are changed frequently; further-
more, they should never store them 
in the clear. These rules are simple 
and obvious—but often (though 
not always), they’re wrong.
The problem with unguessable 
passwords, especially if they’re 
changed frequently, is that they’re 
too often forgotten. At that point, 
backup methods come into play—
your mother’s maiden name, your 
favorite color, email reminders 
and so on. These are generally less 
secure. Besides, the most common 
way passwords are compromised 
today is via keystroke loggers, 
not guesses—and keystroke log-
gers don’t care if your password is 
a modified version of the second 
letters of the fourth verse of the 
Klingon national anthem.
One-way password hashing 
seems like an obvious solution; af-
ter all, it protects the password file 
against theft. However, doing that 
rules out reminder notices (very 
important for low-value Web pass-
words); more important, you can’t 
use a hashed password for challenge-
response authentication, negotiat-
ing a shared cryptographic session 
key, or for other such things.
The hashed password example 
illustrates the real point: there is a 
trade-off not just between security 
and functionality, but between dif-
ferent aspects of security. Which is 
more important, protecting against 
a stolen password file or being able 
to generate a shared session key? A 
checklist can’t answer that ques-
tion, however well-intentioned.
Other checklist entries are 
more or less harmless, if you don’t 
count the wasted effort. We’re told 
“always use a firewall” but why? 
Firewalls can be very helpful, in 
the right environment and with 
the proper configuration, but in 
other situations, they add no secu-
rity— it’s rarely useful to protect a 
public Web server with a firewall, 
for example. Port 80 is the most 
dangerous port on the server, but 
it’s the one port that must be al-
lowed through.
Other times, firewalls can 
cause a false sense of security. 
Fundamentally, firewalls are pol-
icy enforcement points, so what 
matters, more than anything, is 
the policy they enforce. If the pol-
icy is too lax, the firewall does no 
good whatsoever. Complex poli-
cies—that is, the kind of policies 
necessary in many large organiza-
tions—are error-prone.1 What’s 
the benefit of such a firewall here?
Even obvious correct advice 
on checklists can be bad. One I 
consulted when writing this col-
umn said “DO use the latest ver-
sion of Eric Allman’s sendmail.” 
(It gives the same advice for many 
other packages.) But installing a 
new version isn’t always simple; a 
few sentences later, the very same 
document notes that “other send-
mail configuration files may not 
be compatible with the latest ver-
sion of sendmail.” Furthermore, 
patches are often incompatible 
with vital applications. Which is 
worse, to risk a penetration or to 
be off the air completely because 
your applications don’t work? The 
answer, of course, is “it depends.”
T hat’s the real danger with checklists: they try to substi-
tute simple adherence to rules for 
thought. A checklist is fine as a re-
minder, but it should never be used 
as a blind substitute for analysis. 
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